Abstract-In this paper we present tools and methods to integrate attack measurements from the Internet with controlled experimentation on a network testbed. We show that this approach provides greater fidelity than synthetic models. We compare the statistical properties of real-world attacks with synthetically generated constant bit rate attacks on the testbed. Our results indicate that trace replay provides fine time-scale details that may be absent in constant bit rate attacks. Additionally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach to study new and emerging attacks. We replay an Internet attack captured by the LAN-DER system on the DETERLab testbed within two hours.
I. Introduction
Testbeds offer a platform for testing and evaluation of networked systems in controlled and repeatable environments. They facilitate studying the impact of network conditions on the security of real network systems and applications [3] . Such study depends on approaches to providing representative network traffic.
Many approaches have been proposed to generate controlled malicious and non-malicious traffic. Creating traffic in testbeds always involves some level of modeling. Some models may be completely abstract, such as constantbitrate attacks. Others create synthetic traffic models, possibly parameterized from real network traffic (such as [11] , [19] ), or involve tools specific for malicious traffic generation (such as Metasploit [13] ).
Synthetic traffic models are attractive because they allow control and generation of any amount of traffic with few or no external constraints. Such models also adapt well to testbeds and they have no privacy concerns. Regardless of the source, the ultimate goal of controlled traffic is to support the development and evaluation of new methods and tools, thus their success depends on their ability to capture whatever traffic features pertain to that study.
The risk of synthetic models is that one gets out only what one puts in: they may miss the dynamics and subtleties of real-world traffic. Malicious and regular network traffic often reflects aspects of the network path, not just sources [7] , [10] . In our previous work, we have shown attack dynamics depend inherently on characteristics such as the number, operating system, load, and hardware of the attackers [8] . These details are often omitted in synthetic models of malicious traffic. The correctness of traffic must be judged by its applicability to the study in which it is used; omission of details in synthetic models forces one to revisit their applicability.
Another challenge of synthetic models is that they always lag current malicious traffic. There is a delay in deploying new models, since models are designed only when malware is understood, yet attacks change and mutate rapidly. In the paper, we import denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that we have captured in LANDER, a network traffic analysis system [6] , to provide malicious traffic models in the DETERLab cyber security testbed. Our approach recreates source and network path conditions by replaying the attacks on the testbed. Thus, even if synthetic models are correct and applicable to a given study, they may be outdated, failing to capture current threats.
The contribution of this paper is to describe an approach for attack capture and immediate replay on a networking testbed. The attack replay tools provide a collective representation of one or more attackers located downstream from the capture point mapped onto a specified node in the testbed (Section II). In Section III, we show that this approach provides greater fidelity than synthetic models. We also show that our approach can quickly feed new attacks into a testbed for evaluation (Section IV), where each attack source may be isolated and modeled individually, as required by some cyber defense strategies.
We expect our tools will provide timely and rich traffic that is applicable to the test of cyber-defenses such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls. Trace replay is richer than synthetic models because it captures many (even unknown) features in traffic, and it is more timely, with testbed experiments possible within two hours of attack capture. The data sets, our tools, and the DETERLab testbed are all available for use by network security researchers.
II. Approach
In this paper we discuss a methodology to detect and capture attacks using LANDER, and then replay this traffic in a scenario constructed in DETERLab. We discuss our approach in this section and present an analysis of the fidelity this approach may offer in the following section.
A. Capturing Network Traffic with LANDER
We capture network traffic with the LANDER system [6] . LANDER supports capture and anonymization of network traffic, using parallel processing to support high data rates and significant and varying amounts of analystdriven-processing. It is currently in operation, with small deployments running on single (but multi-core) systems with commodity network cards, and large deployments capturing traffic at 10 Gb/s with back-end anonymization and analysis on shared 1000-node compute clusters.
For this paper, the important aspects of LANDER are that it provides the policies that enable us to get permission to collect packet, the flexibility to plug in different detection modules to detect interesting events, and the framework to extract anonymized traces in near-real time.
LANDER moves data through multiple queues, each with different differing policies for data anonymization. Incoming packet headers are grouped into 512 MB segments as they arrive and sent to a raw queue. When data arrives in a queue, LANDER calls a system-or user-provided function that processes the data, optionally placing the results on another queue. For example, a system-provided callback takes data from the raw queue, anonymizes it by changing IP addresses using prefix-preserving anonymization [20] and removing all application payloads, then places that on an anonymized queue. One can provide multiple levels of anonymization by chaining one queue to another and allowing analysts access to only appropriate queues. (We have considered the specifics of the anonymization methods and and their resilience to threat, but those topics are outside the scope of this short paper.) This range of policies is important to support diverse deployments. In some environments, very strong expectations of privacy must be enforced. In other environments, such as a small research laboratory where all parties consent, requirements may be different. For example, we use LANDER as a tool to audit consenting but not-fully-trusted parties.
The second aspect of LANDER that is important is that there can be multiple analyst efforts consuming data at each queue. Each consumer provides a callback that is invoked as each segment arrives. This mechanism allows us to plug in different analysis tools, such as our DoSdetection methods [7] , as well as off-the-shelf tools like SNORT [2] , Bro [14] , and Suricata [1] .
Finally, in this paper we bring these pieces together to operate in near-real time. We configure LANDER to provide fully anonymized packet headers to SNORT as detection mechanisms. Once an attack is identified, we extract the packet headers for replay. We describe the flow of data later in Section IV.
B. DETERLab: A Playground for Attacks
The DETERLab provides infrastructure, tools, and methodologies for networking and cyber security experimentation. The DETERLab testbed includes 570 PCs and specialized hardware located at two sites; USC/ISI in Marina del Rey, CA and UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA. The two sites are interconnected with a shared 10Gbps links. The DETERLab containerization tools enable researchers to allocate internet-scale topologies using virtualization of nodes. DETERLab also provides the Montage AGent Infrastructure (MAGI) tools for orchestrating a wide range of networking and cyber security experimentation scenarios [16] . The MAGI tools provide an event-based control overlay for deploying and controlling agent modules on the topology. Each agent enacts a particular behavior, for example, a attacker behavior, and the behavior is configured and controlled through an Agent Activation Language (AAL).
C. Replaying An Attack Scenario in DETERLab
DETERLab provides a playground for attack experiments and the MAGI tools allow researchers to systematically explore the experimentation design space. The contribution in this paper is to take traces from the real world with LANDER, and recreate the attack in DETERLab.
Each experiment scenario has three phases: (i) preattack phase during which we generate only non-malicious network traffic, (ii) the attack phase, during which we deploy the attack and observe how it interacts with the nonmalicious traffic, and (iii) the post-attack phase once the attack terminates and once again we have only non-malicious network traffic.
We generate web traffic to create non-malicious network traffic throughout the duration of the experiment. A MAGI webserver agent deploys an Apache web server on the specified server nodes and a MAGI webclient agent deploys a curl-based script on the client nodes. Each web client requests a variable sized page from the web server. Once the current web page is downloaded, the web client requests the next page. In Section III we discuss the parameters used to configure the web client agent and discuss our observations in detail.
We generate two types of attacks during the second phase of the scenario; replay attacks and CBR attacks. To replay the attack trace, we developed a attack-replay agent based on the tcpreplay toolset [15] . It adapts the real-world trace to the testbed in two operations. It first remaps the source and destination MAC and IP addresses in the LANDER attack trace. If the original attack has source IP address spoofing, the source IP addresses are not modified. It then replays the attack with proper timing from one or more locations in the scenario topology.
Additionally, to compare the replay of a real attack to an alternative attack, we generate synthetic attack traffic with a MAGI attack-CBR agent. The attack-CBR agent generates a constant bit rate packet rate stream on the network to represent an attack. The agent can be parametrized with protocol, packet size distributions, port number distributions, ramp up and ramp down rates, low and high attack rates; we look at two variations with different numbers of CBR agents.
Lastly, we deploy a packetCapture agent to capture all the packets seen at the observation point in the topology. The packetCapture agent uses tcpdump to capture packets at the specified interface. It can be configured with a packet filter, capture packet size, and the capture file storage location.
III. Richness in Replayed Attacks
We next present an analysis of the additional fidelity real-world attacks offer. First, we discuss how the tools from the last section come together to allow us to systematically explore and compare the different attacks in DETERLab. We then provide a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the attack replay as compared to synthetically generated CBR attacks.
Our goal is to evaluate the "richness" of the traffic during replay. By richness we mean how appropriate the traffic is to use in a protocol study or evaluation. The specific aspects of traffic that make it applicable to a study necessar- ily depend on that study (traffic is not inherently "rich" or "poor", but must be considered in the context of a specific study question [4] ). Here we evaluate richness by looking at regularity of the attack traffic, as measured by the distribution of packet interarrival times and the visual complexity of the timeseries. This measure is relevant to some IDS detection methods, but other studies may require different kinds of richness. We suggest, however, that trace replay captures a much broader range of richness than synthetic traffic.
A. Traces to Experiments
We now describe how we create three types of scenarios to explore the richness of the replayed LANDER attacks and compare them to synthetically generated CBR attacks on the DETER testbed.
We conduct three controlled experiments on the DE-TER testbed: a replay of a real-world attack [17] , a singleattacker, constant-bit rate, synthetic attack with a rate of 4200 packets/s, a ten-attacker, constant-bit rate, synthetic attack with an aggregate rate of 4200 packets/s (each attacker at 420 packets/s).
Here we use a dataset from LANDER with three separate denial-of-service attacks captured in 2002 and 2003 [17] . In this paper, we use the first attack, a reflector attack that send ICMP echo reply packets to a victim in Los Nettos. We refer to this attack as LANDER-2002. The mix of attack and background traffic is shown in Figure 1. The attack consists of echo reply packets from approximately 140 attackers, with each packet carrying a 28 byte payload. Due to small size packets, we see the attack most clearly in Figure 1a ; it hardly shows up when one measures bitrate (Figure 1b) . We choose this attack from the dataset since it had the lowest variance in the attack rate. Even though visually this attack looks similar to a constant bit rate attack, in the next section, we systematically explore the richness in this attack as compared to synthetically generated CBR attacks.
We first process this trace to filter out attack traffic targeted to the victim. This attack is then transferred to the DETER testbed and processed by the MAGI attackreplay agent to generate an attack on the experiment topology. Additionally, we used the MAGI attack-CBR agent to generate the two constant bit rate attacks as discussed above. These models are somewhat simple-one could vary packet sizes, have sources come and go, attempt to reproduce higher-order statistics of the traffic, or arbitrary other variations. A review of current practice suggests, however, that CBR or multi-CBR models are commonly used and so are not unrepresentative of current practice. While other, much more complex models can capture more detail, growth in number of parameters inevitably raises questions about how those parameters should be configured. Here we highlight models that require minimal researcher configuration: CBR or multi-CBR compared to trace replay.
We generate non-malicious background traffic using four webclients agents and two webserver agents on a dumbbell topology. The web clients request a constant webpage of 10MB from a randomly chosen webserver. The attack is launched from a bank of attackers attached to one webserver. We deploy the packetCapture agent at an observation point on the bottleneck link. It captures all packets in the experiment with zero packet loss. The experiment description along with the traces is available online [5] .
B. Attack Traffic
As discussed in the previous section, we compare two types of synthetic attacks with attack trace replay to study the dynamics. Figure 2 show the attack rate in packets/second and the empirical probability distributions for all three types of attack. The top row shows the attack packet rates. The x-axis show time in seconds and the y-axis shows the rate in packets/second. The bottom row shows both the empirical probability distribution function and the cumulative distribution function of the attack rates. The x-axis is the packet rate sampled at 1 millisecond to expose finetimescale dynamics of the packet rate. Bars in the plot and the left y-axis show the probability distribution function as the normalized frequency of the observed packet rate. The line and the right y-axis show the packet rates plotted as a cumulative distribution function.
Qualitative differences in testbed attacks: We first look at overall features in the different methods of generating testbed attack traffic. We begin with the trace replay in Figure 2c . On the top right, we see the attack traffic is "noisy" with lots of fine variation. The bottom right graph shows that the exact attack rate varies quite a bit in each millisecond with a wide range of possible values, since both the PDF and the CDF show a smooth variation over a continuous range. We argue that these variations are not unusual, but are an inherent part in any real-world DDoS attack. These variations arise because attacks originate on different types of hardware, sometimes with other software competing for compute cycles. They also traverse different networks en-route to their target, experiencing different kinds of cross-traffic, including delay and sometimes loss. We have seen these effects before in wide-area traces and explored them through controlled experiments [7] , [8] . In this experiment we show that through replay, we can recreate these subtleties on the testbed. By contrast, Figures 2a and Figure 2b show much less richness and variation. The synthetic, single-source CBR attacker in Figure 2a shows very regular traffic occasionally interrupted by bursts of variation (top graph, with bursts at about 45 s, 85 s, 125 s, etc.). The distribution of arrivals,however, is strongly modal, with 4 or 5 packets per millisecond 80% of the time. There is far less variability than the real-world attack. This lack of variability presents a much different attack to an intrusion detection systeman IDS that would see this periodic traffic would easily find this synthetic attack while missing the more complex, real-world one. Figure 2b shows that more synthetic attackers provide a richer attack. Each attacker sends at a lower rate, but the aggregate rate is the same. We see more variation in the CDF (Figure 2b bottom graph) , because each of the 10 attackers is slightly different. However, the aggregate traffic (top graph) is much smoother -the 10 attackers jitter largely cancels each other out.
We conclude that real-world traffic shows variation and jitter at timescales of milliseconds (Figure 2c ). This richness is lost with synthetic attacker, even when run as teams on multiple machines. If a testbed is to reproduce the kind of real-world complexity it must employ more sophisticated tools and methodologies than just simple synthetic attacks.
Quantifying differences in testbed attacks: To quantity the difference in the spread and variance we compute the average absolute deviation (AAD). For a given sampling bin of p seconds, we define the arrival process x(t) as the number of packets that arrive in the bin [t, t + p). Thus, a T second long packet trace will have N = T /p samples. The AAD is then defined as
whereX is the mean of the attack rate. Since this measure does not square the distance from the mean, it is less affected by extreme observations than metrics such as variance and standard deviation. Table I summarizes the mean, median, standard deviation and the average absolute deviation for the three types of attack reply.
The constant bit rate attacks have a similar mean and median value but for the LANDER-2002 attack, the mean is almost twice the median value. The results indicate that there is a wide range of attack packet arrival rates for realworld attacks when considering the fine time scales. The arrival process is averaged out as the size of the sampling bin p increases. As seen in the top row on the Figure 2 , all three attacks qualitatively look similar when sampled at 1 sec. However, as reported in Table I , the statistical properties of the attacks are very different when the attacks are sampled at 1 msec. We see that standard deviation is much higher as more attackers participate, and the LANDER-2002 trace has the largest standard deviation.
The AAD for the single source attack is the smallest indicating this experiment closely resembles a constant bit rate of 4200 packets/sec. The AAD for the other two experiments in significantly higher indicating high variability in the arrival rate of the attack packets. These measures demonstrate the large difference between simpler synthetic attacks and trace replay. Taken with the qualitative comparison, we argue that it is essential to use trace replay if fine timescale details of attacks matter to whatever mechanism is being studied in a testbed.
IV. Rapid Attack Turn-around: Today's Attacks Today Trace replay has the promise to rapidly turn around attacks into reusable models. This speed is possible because replay of traces does not require understanding of their contents. They can therefore be used to quickly test new defenses, in parallel with analysis of the underlying attack that can lead to more parsimonious, parameterized models that will eventually explore a wider range of scenarios.
To demonstrate the ability to rapidly take an observation to a replayable tool in a testbed, we next carry out an experiment to demonstrate the process. Our target is a DNS amplification attack [9] , such as those that took place in March 2013 [12] . In principle, we could watch our network for a new attack to appear. However, because of publishing deadlines, we instead decided to stage our own mini-attack.
We deployed six DNS servers at ISI in Marina del Rey, California, U.S.A. A trigger computer, also at ISI, then sent a stream of 400 DNS queries per second at these servers with a spoofed source address of a machine in Ft. Collins, Colorado. We recorded traffic as it leaves ISI and as it enters CSU. We detect the attack with a custom SNORT rule. We then extract the traces and hand them to MAGI for exploration in DETERLab. Because this attack is emulated, we know there is no non-attack traffic sent to the victims. In an operational system one would expect the attack detection tool to classify identify incoming traffic as attack or benign. Figure 3 shows the attack and background traffic captured by LANDER during the attack. The attack starts at 403 seconds and lasts for about 900 seconds. Each attack packet is a 3700 B DNS query response packet which is fragmented by the network into three packets. The rate changes seen at the start of the attack are due to us exploring different attack parameters for the experiment. lasts for more than 16 minutes, the first segment with the start of the attack completes about 1 minute into the attack. The attack continues, but this segment then becomes available for analysis. The change in traffic rates triggers SNORT about 7 minutes into the experiment. SNORT runs quickly (about 5 s per segment), but needs to examine 1 minute of traffic to establish that the attack traffic has changed the baseline from regular operation. Due to this parallelism, we detect the attack while it's still in progress.
We do not begin processing the trace files until the attack completes. When it completes, we convert the traces to pcap format, compress them, and move them from the LANDER system onto shared network. The 17 minutes of traces are 1278 MB of data compressed. This processing takes about 7 minutes. If our system was automated, pro-cessing and transfer could run concurrent with the attack, reducing this time greatly.
Once LANDER detects and provides the attack trace files, we copy the data to the DETER testbed's shared file system from where it can be accessed by the MAGI attack-replay agent during the experiment. Transferring the data to DETER takes about 2.5 minutes. We now swap-in an experiment and orchestrate it using the MAGI toolkit. Once the attack-replay agent is deployed on the attacker nodes in the topology, the agent makes a copy of the trace file on the local disk for processing. The agent then installs the tcpreplay tools, uncompresses the trace file, and changes the victim IP address and source and destination MAC addresses in the trace. Processing the trace file for replay and deploying it into the testbed takes about 22 minutes. The attack-replay agent signals the orchestrator that it is ready to start the experiment. For the scenarios explored in the paper, the attack is replayed 100 s after the start of the non-malicious traffic.
This exercise shows that we are able to turn around an attack into a testbed experiment in less than two hours. The main uncertainty in the process is attack detection, moving data from the locations of collection to replay, and human decision making. Our current approach is far from optimized. With better pipelining, we believe we could replay attacks while they are still underway. Also with greater automation, some steps that currently are human-driven can be removed. We believe this simple exercise shows the potential of our approach for researchers requiring fresh data. Data from the emulated attack we presented here is available from PREDICT as dataset DoS_DNS_amplification-20130617 [18] .
V. Conclusions
This paper has outlined the advantages and the potential of trace replay as a means of improving network security research. We show that replaying real-world attacks allows including fine time scale detail that are absent in synthetically generated constant bit rate attacks. Integrating LANDER data sets into the DETERLab provides higher quality data for testbed experiments. The methodology presented in this paper provides a way to rapidly incorporate new attacks into DETERLab experiments. Our tools and datasets are available for public use [5] . Please contact the authors if they could be of use to you.
